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Global Racist Contagion
Following Donald Trump’s Election
September 23, 2019
Abstract
Exploiting the coincidence between the timing of U.S. presidential elec-
tions and the fieldwork period of the European Social Survey, we show that
Donald Trump’s win significantly increased self-reported racial bias in policy
attitudes outside the U.S. We document that the opposite occurred following
Barack Obama’s first election in 2008, while no effect occurred when he or
George W. Bush were reelected in 2012 and 2004. We show that the increase in
self-reported racial bias is not driven by welfare-related immigration concerns,
campaign effects, or bandwagon effects, suggesting a decrease in the social de-
sirability of racial equality.
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1 Introduction
The election of Donald Trump was followed by a spike in the number of hate
crimes and online harassment targeting minorities (Hauslohner Abigail, 2016, Po-
tok, 2017, Leving and Grisham, 2017, Müller and Schwarz, 2018). One explanation
holds that this sequence of events reflected a shift in social norms: While pro-racial
equality attitudinal trends in the U.S. had spread optimism about the future of
race-relationship, Donald Trump’s win signaled that social norms had shifted to-
wards a greater acceptance of racist attitudes (Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin, 2017;
Crandall, Miller and White, 2018; Rushin and Sims, 2018).
While the available evidence pertains to the U.S., concerns that Donald Trump’s
win legitimized racist attitudes abroad were voiced in media across the globe (see
e.g. Shabi, 2016). Al-Jazeera even worried that “Trump’s electoral victory has
been a wake call for all democratic nations to consider the solidification of the
global right-wing and discriminatory politics in Europe and beyond” (Cherkaoui,
2016). Were those concerns founded? To answer that question, we test whether
the election of Donald Trump increased racial bias in policy attitudes outside the
U.S.
To identify the effect of Donald Trump’s election, we exploit the coincidence of
the 2016 U.S. presidential election with the fieldwork period of 13 developed coun-
tries sampled by the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS provides individual-
level information about political attitudes, including attitudes on race-targeting
policies. Most of all, the day of the interview can be considered as good as ran-
dom with respect to the day of the election (Bar-Tal and Labin, 2001; Perrin and
Smolek, 2009; Legewie, 2013). Using a quasi-experimental approach, we com-
pare self-reported racial bias among respondents interviewed after the election (the
treatment group) and those interviewed before the election (the control group).
We find evidence that the probability to report a racial bias increased by 2.3 per-
centage points within an interval of±15 days around the election of Donald Trump.
The treatment effect is statistically significant and robust to several econometric
specifications, including different sets of controls, time intervals, clustering, and
covariate-balancing strategies. As the ESS has typically been run from Septem-
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ber to January every even year since 2002, we can replicate the main analysis for
previous U.S. elections. The main result is unlikely to be spurious: We find that
self-reported racial bias significantly decreased when Barack Obama, arguably the
near-perfect opposite of Donald Trump on race-related issues, won a first mandate.
Conversely, elections that did not change the status quo, as when George W. Bush
and Barack Obama received a second mandate in 2004 and 2012, had no significant
effect on self-reported attitudes displaying racial bias.
We interpret our findings in light of the literature studying the effect of social
norms on the report of sensitive attitudes (see e.g., Kuklinski, Cobb and Gilens,
1997; Kuklinski, et al., 1997; Holbrook and Krosnick, 2009; Janus, 2010; Weber et
al., 2014; Bursztyn, Egorov and Fiorin, 2017). In a world where the social norm
of racial-neutrality is mainstream, reporting a racial bias entails a social cost that
racially-biased respondents may avoid by insincerely reporting no bias. However,
the election of Donald Trump, a candidate with racially-biased views, signaled that
the social norm of racial-neutrality was less mainstream than previously assumed.
Consequently, the expected social cost of expressing racist attitudes decreased,
making them ceteris paribus more likely to be reported (Bursztyn, Egorov and
Fiorin, 2017). By the same token, the first election of Barack Obama signaled
an increase in the social desirability of racial-neutrality and hence lowered the
probability to report racially-biased attitudes, whereas elections confirming the in-
cumbent did not provide novel information about social norms and hence did not
affect the report of racially-biased attitudes.
The mechanism relies on the assumption that the election of Donald Trump,
and those of his predecessors, did not affect race-related attitudes, but rather the
likelihood of reporting them. While this assumption cannot be directly tested in
our setting, further analysis corroborates its validity. We show that the treatment
effect does not reflect a gradual change in race-related attitudes occurring around
the election. In particular, neither pre-electoral campaign effects nor post-electoral
bandwagon effects fully account for our main finding.
The nexus between Donald Trump’s win and the likelihood to report sensitive
attitudes has found early empirical evidence in lab experiments (Huang and Low,
2017; Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin, 2017; Crandall, Miller, and White 2018). We
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contribute to that literature in two ways. Firstly, while Huang and Low (2017),
Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin (2017), and Crandall, Miller, and White (2018) rely
on lab-experiments, we mimic a natural experiment design based on representative
samples from observational data. Secondly, while those works focus on the impact
of Donald Trump’s election on attitudes and norms of behavior in the U.S., we
are the first to provide an exploratory analysis of the transnational contagion of
racially biased attitudes.
2 Empirical analysis
2.1 Sample
The data we use come from Round 8 of the European Social Survey, which includes
18 countries. Donald Trump’s election fell inside the survey fieldwork period of
13 of them. The fieldwork periods, detailed in appendix, typically lasted three to
four months. The survey is constructed using highly rigorous translation protocols
and conditional monetary incentives are granted to units upon the completion of
face-to-face interviews.
2.2 Empirical model
To identify racially biased attitudes, we use questions B38 and B39 of the ESS.
Specifically, question B38 reads, “To what extent do you think the country should
allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most people of the country to come
and live here?” Question B39 directly follows question B38 and reads, “How about
people of a different race or ethnic group from most people?” Answers to both ques-
tions range from (1) “Allow many” to (4) “Allow none”.
Because the two questions only differ in the race dimension, the differences in
answers can only be driven by differences in the perception of migrants according
to their race. By giving different answers to the two questions, respondents there-
fore knowingly reveal a racial bias. Most of all, because interviews are conducted
face-to-face, respondents are subject to a stronger social pressure than in internet
surveys, where racially biased opinions are revealed anonymously (Seth, 2013).
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Denoting respondent i’s opposition to different and same race immigration by
y1i and y2i, respectively, the dependent variable “self-reported racial bias in policy
attitudes”, yi, is defined as a dummy variable taking the value 1 if y1i > y2i and 0
otherwise. In the relevant sample, 32.70% of individuals report stronger opposition
to different race immigration than same-race immigration, while 64.80% report
equal opposition to different-race immigrants. While such operationalization of
the dependent variable has the advantage of simplicity, we discuss its limits and
test the robustness of our results to using two alternatives in appendix (B). Reports
of racist attitudes (yi = 1) account for 31.49% in the control group and 34.06% in the
treatment group.1
Defining Yi,c = ln
[
Pr(yi,c=1)
1−Pr(yi,c=1)
]
, we use the following specification:
Yi,c = α + βTi + γ
′Xi,c + µc + i,c.
Ti ∈ {0, 1} is the treatment variable. It takes the value 1 if respondent i was
interviewed after November 8, 2016 and 0 otherwise. Even though asymmetric
levels of respondents’ reachability as well as geographic imbalance may induce
a non-random selection of respondents among the control and treatment groups
(Legewie, 2013; Munoz et al., 2018), the timing of each interview is as good as
random with respect to the timing of the U.S. election. Ti can therefore be inter-
preted as an exogenous signal of the decrease in the social desirability of reporting
racially-neutral attitudes. Accordingly, β measures the effect of Donald Trump’s
win on the propensity to report racist attitudes. α is a constant.
Xi,c summarizes individual-level characteristics. In a first model, we only con-
trol for demographic characteristics including age, age squared, sex, household
status (having at least one child living at home), and ethnic minority status (0 if
majority, 1 if minority). We then add socioeconomic characteristics: highest educa-
tion attainment (1-7), a dummy capturing economic insecurity (0 if the respondent
experienced short run unemployment during the previous year, and 1 otherwise)
12.49% of respondents oppose same race immigration more than different race immigration,
displaying “positive racism”. In an alternative specification, we allow the dependent variable to
take the value −1 in the latter case. As the number of units reporting positive racism is extremely
limited, treatment effects are very close in the two cases.
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and household’s income (1 meaning living comfortably through 4 meaning living
with strong difficulties). We subsequently add a dummy equal to 1 if the respon-
dent voted in the latest general election, to capture interest in politics. Note that
we only select proper covariates, i.e. covariates that could not be affected by the
treatment. To control for unobserved country heterogeneity, we include country
fixed effects µc. i,c is an idiosyncratic error term, with E [ |T,X, µ ] = 0. Finally, we
weight observations by the design weights provided by the ESS to control for the
relative likelihood of each observation to be sampled.
Respondents in the treatment and control groups may differ in the distribution
of key covariates. While the ESS is meant to be representative of each country’s
population in the overall period, there is no guarantee that representativeness
holds within particular sub-periods, for instance because of reachability issues.
Following Hainmueller (2012), we therefore weight control units such that the dis-
tribution of covariates in the control group matches the moment conditions (until
skewness) of the treatment group. After this pre-processing, covariate imbalance
between control and treatment groups becomes negligible.
We fit the model with a binary logit estimator and report the average marginal
effect. Since both the treatment and the output variables are dummies, the marginal
effect is easy to interpret: It provides the difference in percentage points between
the treated and control groups in the probability of a respondent exhibiting a racial
bias. We base our main analysis on an interval of ±15 days before and after
the election. This bandwidth choice reflects a trade-off between statistical power,
which is greater the larger the bandwidth, and attribution, which is more accu-
rate the smaller the bandwidth. We discuss in greater details this rather arbitrary
choice and report treatment effects for alternative bandwidths in appendix.
The ideal dataset to study a “global contagion” should include race-related atti-
tudes of each individual in each country both before and after the election. Instead,
we had to run the analysis on a sample of 13 countries. We therefore face sample
uncertainty (Abadie et al., 2017). Moreover, race-related reports are observed ei-
ther before or after the election. Consequently, we also face design uncertainty
(Abadie et al., 2017). For these reasons, we cluster errors at the country level.
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3 Results
3.1 Main test
Table 1 shows that the hypothesis that Donald Trump’s win increased global self-
reported racial bias in policy attitudes cannot be rejected. In column (i), the treat-
ment effect, computed as a simple mean-difference, is equal to 3.2 percentage
points and statistically significant at p < .01. In column (ii), we control for coun-
try fixed effects only. Being interviewed after Donald Trump’s election increases
the likelihood of reporting a racial bias by 1.8 percentage points, and the outcome
is now significant at p < .05. Columns (iii) and (iv) add control variables pertain-
ing, respectively, to demographic and socioeconomic characteristics. The treatment
effect slightly exceeds 2 percentage points.
In column (v), we include self-reported turnout in the latest national election.
The treatment effect is nearly unaffected and stays significant at p < .01. A key
comparison is the one between columns (v) and (vi). When the control units are
weighted to match the covariates’ distribution of treated units, the treatment ef-
fect hardly increases. This suggests that sample imbalance is not severe. In the
full specification of column (vi), on which we are going to rely to address further
identification issues, Donald Trump’s election increases the probability of reporting
a racial bias by 2.3 percentage points, significant at p < .01.
The appendix digs deeper into the temporal and spatial dimensions of the treat-
ment effect. As the lengths of the fieldwork periods are limited and different among
countries, we remain agnostic about medium-run effects. However, we show that
the main result is robust to alternative bandwidths. We also compare each coun-
try’s specific treatment effect with the aggregate one. We document that the treat-
ment effect is significantly lower than average in Sweden, Finland and Estonia,
suggesting the presence of a Scandinavian cluster of non-updaters. The treatment
effect is significantly higher than average in Austria, Switzerland, and the Nether-
lands, suggesting the presence of a continental cluster of stronger updaters, paral-
leled by Israel.
We also perform several robustness checks. Firstly, we show that alternative
modeling strategies as well as alternative operationalizations of the dependent
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Racial bias (0-1)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Treatment (0-1) .031∗∗∗ .017∗∗ .020∗∗∗ .021∗∗∗ .022∗∗∗ .023∗∗∗
SE (.011) (.009) (.008) (.009) (.009) (.008)
N.obs 7,904 7,904 7,855 7,720 7,685 7,685
Country Effects yes yes yes yes yes
Demographics yes yes yes yes
Socioeconomics yes yes yes
Voting yes yes
Entropy balancing yes
Coefficients for treatment effect: average marginal effects following Logit estimation. significant at .1,
∗∗: significant at .05, ∗∗∗: significant at .01. Standard errors clustered at country level in each model.
The analysis is based on 4,064 effective control and 3,653 effective treated units. Countries: Austria,
Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Estonia, Finland, UK, Israel, Norway, Sweden, and Slovenia. Demo-
graphics: age (15-105), age squared, gender (0-1), household status (0-1), minority status (0-1), and
domicile (1-4). Socioeconomics: education attainment (1-7), income status (1-4), and a dummy captur-
ing whether the respondent experienced short-run unemployment during the last year (0-1). Voting
takes value one if the respondent voted at latest general election (0-1) Entropy balancing weights units
in order for the distribution of covariates of the control group to match the distribution of covariates
of the treated group, until skewness. Design weights apply. Source: ESS, round 8.
Table 1: Effect of Donald Trump’s election on self-reported racial bias.
variable yield qualitatively and quantitatively close treatment effects. Secondly,
to deal with the sample selection issues that our pre-treatment matching strategy
may not capture, we run the same analysis again after balancing for reachability
and geographic imbalance. We obtain very similar treatment effects. These tests
are reported in appendix.
3.2 Threats to identification
Trump v. previous elections. Our strategy rests on the contention that Don-
ald Trump’s election marked a change in the status quo toward lower social de-
sirability of racial equality. To see what would have happened to race-related at-
titudes if the status quo had changed toward higher racial equality, we apply our
design to Barack Obama’s first election, which is arguably the closest to a perfect
opposite of Donald Trump’s. Figure 1a shows that the effect of his first election
was the opposite of Donald Trump’s: The report of racial bias in policy attitudes
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decreased significantly at p < .05.2
A second question regarding counterfactuals is the following: What would have
happened if the status quo had not changed? George W. Bush’s 2004 and Barack
Obama’s 2012 elections represent appealing counterfactuals, since the incumbents
were confirmed, hence there was no change in the status quo. Figure 1a shows that
the effect of the 2004 and 2012 elections, which granted second mandates respec-
tively to George W. Bush and Barack Obama, is not statistically distinguishable
from zero.
Racist v. immigration attitudes. The two questions we combine to construct
the dependent variable only differ in the racial background of immigrants. How-
ever, race-targeting policies may face opposition due to welfare concerns, rather
than racism (Bobo and Kluegel, 1993). Respondents in the ESS may have simply
used race as a proxy for specific labor market skills or the demand for public goods
(Dustmann and Preston, 2007). In that case, expressing greater opposition to dif-
ferent v. same-race immigration would be driven by welfare concerns, rather than
racism. However, the results shown in Figure 1b show that the documented effect
on self-reported racial bias is not driven by economic-related immigration concerns.
In appendix, we moreover show that policy attitudes less ostensibly related with
Donald Trump’s campaign - including redistribution, environmental protection and
gay rights - are left unaffected by the election.
Electoral v. campaign effect. Schaffner (2017) shows that being exposed to
Donald Trump’s campaign increased individuals’ willingness to express xenopho-
bic opinions against minorities. Morrison et al. (2018) moreover show that assault
frequency increased on days and in cities where candidate Donald Trump cam-
paigned. As the campaign was covered worldwide, his xenophobic rhetoric may
2One may argue that the informational content of Donald Trump’s win was stronger than the
one of Barack Obama’s 2008 win. In the first case, the electoral outcome was unexpected given
pre-electoral polls. In the latter case, the outcome was less unexpected: Barack Obama and John
McCain had close approvals until October, but Barack Obama gained an edge over John McCain
during the last month. This may make the election itself less informative. It cannot be denied,
however, that the election of the first African-American President in the U.S. marked an important
discontinuity in world politics from the perspective of a global audience.
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also have changed the willingness to report racist attitudes abroad prior to the
election. This would bias our treatment effect downward. However, Figure 1c es-
tablishes that moving the treatment one week, 15 days, three weeks, or 30 days
before the actual election, keeping a symmetric interval of time around it, yields
no significant treatment effect. Although Donald Trump’s rise in popularity dur-
ing the campaign may have affected race-related attitudes, it does not threaten the
validity of our estimates of the effect of his election per se.
Electoral v. bandwagon effect. The election of Donald Trump may have af-
fected a broad set of political attitudes due to a standard bandwagon effect, lead-
ing individuals to rally with the winning opinion (Fleitas, 1971). The observed
change in race-related attitudes may then simply reflect a wider alignment on the
positions of Donald Trump or on the perceived new stance of the US. Figure 1b
however shows that some of the most archetypal political attitudes, including left-
right placement and the support for right-wing populist parties remained constant,
suggesting no generalized bandwagon effect.
4 Conclusion
Our analysis combines a methodological and a substantive contribution. While
the extant literature focuses on the effect of Donald Trump’s election on domes-
tic social norms, we study its effect on social norms abroad and provide evidence
consistent with a phenomenon of contagion. The study of norm diffusion in world
politics is so far limited, as the field of international organization has focused on
an institutional top-down channel, whereby local social norms in a country change
following institutional decisions inspired or imposed by a focal country (Acharya,
2004; Klotz, 1995). Our paper suggests that another informational channel, based
on the reaction of citizens to election results abroad, may also cause shifts in global
norms. Which mechanisms underlie and moderate the contagion? How do the
institutional and informational channels interact? These questions represent an
interesting avenue for future research.
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(a) Trump v. previous elections. (b) Racist v. immigration attitudes.
(c) Electoral v. campaign effect. (d) Electoral v. bandwagon effect.
Figure 1: Threats to identifications: treatment effects with 95% confidence interval. Coef-
ficients are computed according to model (vi) in Table 1. For discrete dependent variables,
we report ordered Logit coefficients.
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Appendix
A Descriptive statistics
• Table 3 provides the complete descriptive statistics for Donald Trump’s elec-
tion. Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for previous elections.
B Robustness Checks
• Imbalance: Mean and Variance. Table 2 provides the descriptive statis-
tics for each covariate used in the main analysis. It provides information
about the imbalance in covariates between treated and control units before
and after applying entropy balancing. Imbalance is somewhat limited in the
aggregate analysis, as one can already suspect by looking in Table 1 at the
difference between the treatment effect with and without entropy balancing
weighting. The latter became extremely small once entropy balancing was
applied.
• Imbalance: Skewness. Table 2 allows observing means and variances, but
it does not provide information about skewness, which is only relevant for
continuous covariates. Figure 2 provides the kernel density for the four con-
tinuous covariates used in the analysis. Some degree of skewness persists
after balancing on the “age” variable, whereas it essentially disappears for
domicile, education and income. For all of these covariates, the kernel den-
sity of the treated and control groups are almost indistinguishable.
• Alternative specifications. Table 5 provides additional specifications. As
suggested by Hainmueller and Xu (2013), entropy balancing is preceded by
the extraction of outliers operationalized through pre-treatment coarsened
exact matching. We first run an imbalance test on covariates. We then match
control and treated units with coarsened exact matching on imbalanced co-
variates within each country. Units without match are treated as outliers and
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pruned before running the analysis. Details are provided in the table’s foot-
note. In column (i), we provide the treatment effect after outliers’ extraction
and prior to entropy balancing. In column (ii), we apply entropy balancing
after having extracted outliers. In both cases, the treatment effect is slightly
larger than in column (vi) of Table 1. Column (iii) displays the outcome of an
alternative, more ambitious, balancing strategy, in which entropy weighting
is constructed at the country level. The treatment effect gets slightly larger
under this specification.
• With this by country balancing strategy, however, we are not always able to
achieve balance at the third moment. Column (iv) and (v) replicate the anal-
ysis of, respectively, columns (ii) and (iii), but account for the fact that, since
the number of clusters is relatively low (13 countries), standard clustering
may underestimate standard errors. We re-estimate the main result using a
wild cluster bootstrap. The level of significance only decreases from p < .01 to
p < .05 for the country-level balancing specification.
• Finally, in column (vi), we provide the treatment effect for an augmented set
of covariates. In the main text, we deliberately restrict the set of controls
to proper covariates. The effect of the treatment might therefore be driven
by a shift in ideology. To rule that possibility out, we control for three fur-
ther attitudes: left-right placement, political interest, and satisfaction with
democracy. The treatment effect after outliers’ extraction, entropy balanc-
ing, and wild cluster bootstrapping is about 2 percentage points, significant
at p < .01.
• Alternative dependent variable. Call ysame the answer to the “same race
migrants” question and ydiff the answer to the “different race migrants” ques-
tion. Recalling that higher values on the 1-4 scale mean higher opposition,
we construct three different dependent variables.
1. Main (in the text):
yi =
1 if ydiff > ysame0 else
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This approach has the advantage of simplicity, because reported treat-
ment effects can be interpreted directly. It has the disadvantage of not
capturing increases in racial bias for already racially biased individuals
thereby underestimating its actual increase.
2. Alternative I:
yi = ydiff − ysame
This alternative has the advantage of capturing the intensity of the racial
bias. However, an already racially biased individual (say ydiff = 3, ysame =
1) increasing his racial bias (ydiff = 4) would count the same as a racially
unbiased becoming racially biased. An increase in racial bias may ac-
cordingly be driven by a polarization effect.
3. Alternative II:
yi =

1 if ydiff > ysame
0 if ydiff = ysame
−1 else
In this case, we account for the fact that some respondents may favor
different race over same race immigrants. This group is extremely lim-
ited (2.78% of our sample), which is why we used a dummy rather than
a categorical variable in our baseline specification.
We estimated the baseline specification with each alternative definition
of the dependent variable in Table 6. The three approaches lead to very
close empirical conclusions.
• Sampling selection issues: Reachability. Pre-treatment matching ac-
counts for imbalance in covariates among respondents. An additional issue
arises as sampled individuals may be more or less likely to complete the sur-
vey before or after the election. The election of an American president per se
unlikely induces self-selection. However, the respondents who completed the
survey at the first attempt made by the interviewer are more likely to be in
the control group than those for whom several attempts had to be made prior
to completing the survey (Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno and Hernández, 2018). This
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is the issue of reachability: the more reachable a household, the more likely
it is, ceteris paribus, to be interviewed before the election. Reachability would
bias our results if it correlated with characteristics that we do not account for.
The left panel of Figure 3 plots the fraction of households interviewed at the
1st, 2nd, nth attempt in the relevant control and treatment groups. The right
panel considers the whole sample. Figure 3 confirms that the fraction of “eas-
ily reachable” respondents is indeed slightly higher in the control group. The
average number of attempts to get the survey administered is 2.586 in the
control and 2.659 in the treatment group.
To check whether and to which extent reachability biases outcomes, we run
again the main regression controlling for the “reachability” variable, given by
the number of attempts needed for the interviewer to interview the sampled
household. We do this in two ways: (i) by controlling for reachability in the
main regression, and (ii) by dropping individuals with particularly low levels
of reachability. Figure 3 shows that treatment effects according to (i) and (ii)
yield outcomes that are extremely close to those presented in the main table.
• Sampling selection issues: Geographic imbalance. For most countries,
ESS implements strict probability sampling. Multi-stage is only used for
countries lacking reliable addresses of households (see ESS8 Sampling guide-
lines, page 6). As a result, there is a decent balance of before/after collection
by region: for most regions there are data both before and after the election
(Figure 4). As some imbalance persists, and regions may correlate with fea-
tures that our matching strategy does not capture, we run two additional
analyses. In the first, we add region fixed effects. In the second, we also use
entropy weighting to make the control and treatment groups balanced on the
fraction of surveys collected in each region. Both those treatment effects are
extremely close to baseline estimates (see Figure 5).
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Range
Treated Control Imbalance
(Unconditional) (Unconditional) (After balancing) (Unconditional) (After balancing)
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance ∆ Mean ∆ Mean
Age 15-120 48.91 313.9 49.48 337.8 48.91 313.9 -.57 0
Female 0-1 .52 .25 .52 .25 .52 .25 0 0
Domicile 0-3 1.72 1.62 1.86 1.59 1.72 1.62 -.14 0
Household status 0-1 .67 .22 .68 .22 .67 .22 0 0
Minority status 0-1 .06 .05 .05 .05 .06 .05 .01 0
Education attainment 1-7 4.22 2.89 4.28 2.96 4.22 2.89 -.06 0
Income 1-4 1.87 .64 1.88 .66 1.87 .64 .01 0
Unemployment 0-1 .73 .19 .73 .19 .73 .19 0 0
Voted at latest election 0-1 .72 .20 .72 .20 .72 .20 0 0
Table 2: Imbalance: 1. Descriptive statistics and imbalance: before and after entropy
balancing.
(a) Age. (b) Domicile. (c) Income. (d) Educational attain-
ment.
Figure 2: Imbalance: 2. Kernel density of continuous covariates among treatment and
control groups after entropy balancing. The black regular line (grey dashed) plots treated
(control) units.
(a) Relevant sample (±15 days). (b) Entire sample.
Figure 3: Reachability in the control and treatment group.
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Dependent Variables N. obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Racial bias 7,904 .33 .47 0 1
Same race immigration 7,951 2.16 .87 1 4
Different race immigration 7,929 2.57 .91 1 4
Oppose refugees 7,923 3.39 1.78 1 5
Oppose poor migrants 7,906 2.62 .92 1 4
Immigration harms economy 7,848 4.94 2.45 0 10
Immigration harms culture 7,895 5.17 2.64 0 10
Left-right placement 7,415 5.21 2.18 0 10
Support Populist 3,710 .16 .37 0 1
Oppose Redistribution 7,950 2.36 1.07 1 5
Oppose Gay rights 7,861 2.78 1.35 1 5
Independent Variables N. obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Age 8,035 48.36 18.42 15 105
Female 8,053 .52 .50 0 1
Children at home 8,053 .32 .47 0 1
Minority status 8,053 .96 .23 0 1
Domicile 8,047 2.78 1.26 1 5
Income 7,981 1.88 .81 1 4
Education 8,013 4.08 1.72 1 7
Unemployed 8,033 .26 .44 0 1
Voting 8,023 .69 .46 0 1
Table 3: Descriptive statistics, Donald Trump (2016).
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Dependent Variables N. obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Racial bias (Bush, 2004) 11,269 .25 .43 0 1
Racial bias (Obama, 2008) 7,402 .27 .44 0 1
Racial bias (Obama, 2012) 8,208 .31 .46 0 1
Independent Variables (Bush, 2004) N. obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Age 11,637 45.86 18.59 15 99
Female 11,673 .52 .50 0 1
Children at home 11,672 .41 .49 0 1
Minority status 11,676 .96 .20 0 1
Domicile 11,683 3.01 1.17 1 5
Income 11,533 1.97 .85 1 4
Education 11,661 3.32 1.72 1 5
Unemployed 11,633 .25 .43 0 1
Voting 11,600 .70 .46 0 1
Independent Variables (Obama, 2008) N. obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Age 7,617 47.35 18.57 15 123
Female 7,629 .52 .50 0 1
Children at home 7,586 .37 .48 0 1
Minority status 7,605 .95 .21 0 1
Domicile 7,615 2.90 1.23 1 5
Income 7,617 1.84 .80 1 4
Education 7,563 3.13 1.37 1 5
Unemployed 7,586 .25 .43 0 1
Voting 7,589 .74 .44 0 1
Independent Variables (Obama, 2012) N. obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Age 8,506 48.36 18.42 15 96
Female 8,519 .53 .50 0 1
Children at home 8,516 .39 .49 0 1
Minority status 8,461 .93 .26 0 1
Domicile 8,510 2.79 1.24 1 5
Income 8,466 1.73 .87 1 4
Education 8,399 4.11 1.81 1 7
Unemployed 8,449 .26 .44 0 1
Voting 8,464 .771 .45 0 1
Table 4: Descriptive statistics, other elections.
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Racial bias (0-1)
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (iv) (v)
Treatment (0-1) .024*** .025*** .025*** .025*** .025** .020***
SE (.008) (.008) (.011) NA NA NA
N.obs 7,301 7,301 7,301 7,301 7,301 6,694
Country Effects X X X X X X
Demographics X X X X X X
Socioeconomics X X X X X X
Voting X X X X X X
Outliers’ extraction (CEM) X X X X X X
Entropy balancing (pooled) X X X
Entropy balancing (by country) X X
Wild Cluster bootstrapping X X X
Further political attitudes X
∗: significant at .1, ∗∗: significant at .05, ∗∗∗ : significant at .01. Coefficients: average marginal effects following a logit estimation. Errors clustered at
country level. Countries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Estonia,Finland, UK, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Slovenia.
Demographics: age, age squared, gender, household status, minority status, and domicile. Socioeconomics: education attainment, income, and recent short-run
unemployment. Entropy balancing designed to satisfy moment conditions until skewness. Outliers’ extraction following coarsened exact matching on imbalanced
covariates (Age and education). Age is coarsened through intervals of 5 years while domicile is coarsened according to Scott-break algorithm. Matching prunes
457 units (270 controls). Wild cluster bootstrapping is run through OLS after 1000 successful resamples. Further political attitudes include: left-right placement
(0-10), political interest (1-4) and satisfaction with democracy (0-10). Design weights apply. Source: ESS, round 8.
Table 5: Alternative specifications. Effect of Donald Trump’s election on self-reported
racial bias, further specifications.
Alternative I Alternative II MAIN
(1-7) (-1, 0 ,1) (0,1)
Treatment (0-1) .123*** .119*** .122***
SE (.043) (.040) (.044)
N. Obs 7,717 7,717 7,717
Country Effects X X X
Demographics X X X
Socioeconomics X X X
Voting X X X
Entropy balancing X X X
∗: significant at .1, ∗∗: significant at .05, ∗∗∗ : significant at .01. Coefficients: Ordered Logit coefficient
for Alternative I and Logit coefficient for Alternative II and MAIN. Errors clustered at country level. Coun-
tries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Estonia, Finland, UK, Israel, Norway, Sweden, and Slovenia.
Demographics: age, age squared, gender, household status, minority status, and domicile. Socioeconomics:
education attainment, income , and recent short-run unemployment. Entropy balancing to satisfy moment
conditions until skewness. Design weights apply. Source: ESS, round 8.
Table 6: Effect of Donald Trump’s election on alternative dependent variables.
23
Figure 4: Survey collection by region before and after the election. No information
available for Israel.
(a) Reachability. (b) Geographic imbalance.
Figure 5: Treatment effects accounting for further sampling issues.
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• Trump v. previous elections. Table 7 shows that, apart from Barack
Obama’s 2008 election, none of the previous elections, studied in exactly the
same way, caused any change in self-reported racial bias. The first three
columns report the coefficient plotted in Figure 1a. In the last three columns,
we show that the treatment effect of Donald Trump’s election is not only pos-
itive and significant, but also significantly larger than the ones from previous
elections. We define Di ∈ {0, 1} as a dummy variable taking the value 1 if
unit i was interviewed in 2016 and 0 if she was interviewed in a previous
round (2004, 2008 or 2012). Following our main specification, we can write
the empirical model as
Yi,c,p = α + βTi,p + δ0Di + δ1Di × Ti,p + γ′Xi,c,p + µc,p + i,c,p.
where we control for country-year fixed effects, µc,p, and cluster errors at the
country-year level. We report the main coefficient of interest, δ1, which is a
difference in difference estimate. As an alternative, we can also test whether
the treatment effect following Donald Trump’s election according to the main
specification is significantly larger than the one following previous elections
with a z − test. Comparing the treatment effect following Donald Trump’s
election with that of George W. Bush 2004, and those of Obama 2008 and
2012, we obtain respectively z = −3.04, z = −3.56, and z = −2.44. Hence the
treatment effect of Donald Trump’s election is significantly larger than the
one in previous elections in a one-sided test at p < .01.3
• Electoral v. Campaign effect. Table 8 reports the treatment effects that
would be obtained applying the same method as in the baseline estimations
around placebo election dates. We moved the treatment by intervals of 5 days
until 30 days before the actual election day and kept symmetric intervals to
3As an additional test, we test whether this outcome holds true when restricting the sample
to countries common to both elections. This exercise cuts substantially the sample, as the set of
countries that happened to be fielded during U.S. elections differs from round to round. Neverthe-
less, the outcome remains significant. Comparing regression coefficients on common countries only
yields z = −2.11, z = −2.45, and z = −1.66, when comparing the treatment effect following Donald
Trump’s election with George W. Bush 2004, and Barack Obama 2008 and 2012. Hence, the com-
parison is significant at p < .05 in the first case, p < .01 in the second case, and p < .1 in the last
case.
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avoid the inclusion of actually treated units. None of the placebo treatment-
dates before the real election yielded any change in self-reported racial bias.
• Racist v. Immigration attitudes. Table 9 reports estimates of the effect of
Donald Trump’s election on four other survey items related to immigration.
Those items read:
– Question C: The government should be generous in judging people’s ap-
plications for refugee status. (1: Agree strongly, ... , 5: Disagree strongly);
– Question B40: Allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries out-
side Europe. (1: Allow many, ... , 4: Allow none);
– Question B41: Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s
economy that people come to live here from other countries? (1: Bad, ... ,
10: Good);
– Question B42: Would you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally
undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other coun-
tries? (1: Undermined, ... , 10: Enriched).
Consistent with our main result, we find no effect of Donald Trump’s election
on welfare-related immigration attitudes, while we find that the only signifi-
cant treatment effect is on cultural concerns for immigration (at p < .1)
• Electoral v. Bandwagon effect. Table 9 provides the outcome relative to
the effect of Donald Trump’s election on four other survey items related to
ideology. Those items read:
– Question B26: Placement on a left-right scale. (1: Left, ... , 10: Right);
– Question B24: Which party do you feel close to. (0: Any or none, ... , 1: a
right-wing populist party);
– Question B23: Government should reduce differences in income levels.
(1: Agree strongly, ... , 5: Disagree strongly);
– Question B36: Gay and lesbian couples should have the same rights to
adopt children as straight couples. (1: Agree strongly, ... , 5: Disagree
strongly).
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We find that the treatment effect is null for each of these cases. We can there-
fore interpret our main finding as signaling that Donald Trump’s election
had no general effect on the opinions of respondents. It therefore specifically
increased the willingness to report opinions that discriminate migrants of a
different race.
• Unrelated issues. Figure 6 shows that the election of Donald Trump had no
effect on policy preferences for redistribution, LGBT rights, and environmen-
tal protection. The relevant proxies for those policy items are the following:
Issue I (Redistribution): Government should reduce differences in income lev-
els. 1: Agree strongly; ... ; 5 Disagree strongly.
Issue II (Environmental protection): Important to care for nature and envi-
ronment. 1: Very much like me; ... ; 6: Not at all like me.
Issue III (LGTB rights): Gays should live their life as they wish. 1: Agree
strongly; ... ; 5 Disagree strongly.
• Following Legewie (2013), we randomly re-assign the binary treatment vari-
able within countries. Internal validity is strengthened if the number of cases
in which the random treatment effect exceeds the actual one is limited. This
test helps ruling out a decisive role of sampling issues in driving the doc-
umented treatment effect. Testing for “permuted treatment effects” on the
main dependent variable reveals that the number of cases in which the ran-
dom treatment effect exceeds the actual one is only 3.2% after 1, 000 Monte-
carlo simulations.
C Further Analysis
• Alternative bandwidths. Following Depetris-Chauvín and Durante (2017),
Giani (2017) and Mikulasche, Pant and Tesfaye (2017), we base our main
analysis on an interval of ±15 days before and after the election. On the one
hand, the chosen interval balances out two necessities. ESS questionnaires
feature a large number of questions, with no collection during weekends. The
27
rate of data collection per country is therefore relatively small. This requires
selecting a sufficiently wide time interval. On the other hand, as race-related
attitudes may vary according to several channels and further events, the ob-
served treatment effects can be credibly attributed to the election outcome
only if intervals are sufficiently close to the election day.
• To make sure that our results are not driven by the choice of the time inter-
val, Table 10 provides the treatment effects over alternative intervals. The
magnitude of the effect remains similar throughout the first month. If we
consider an interval of ±45 days, the treatment effect is still positive and sig-
nificant at p < .1, and stays so exactly until Christmas day, while it becomes
null when using larger time intervals, e.g. a time interval of ±60 days.
We deliberately remain agnostic in what regards medium-term treatment
effects for three reasons. Firstly, we can only credibly attribute observed
changes to transnational electoral spillovers by focusing on the very short
run, especially in light of the additional analysis presented in subsection 2.3.
Conversely, longer intervals of time make confounding factor possibly deci-
sive, and hence attribution problematic. Secondly, our objective is to disen-
tangle an “electoral effect” from other effects that may concur to the evolution
of race-related attitudes, including learning. Thirdly, as Figure 8 details, if
we use an interval of ±15 days, each country’s fieldwork period is active. Con-
versely, using an interval of e.g. ±45 days, Austria and the Czech Republics’
fieldworks are closed. Hence, the increase in sample size from the ±30 days
interval to the ±45 days interval is driven by a set of countries different from
the one considered in the main analysis, thereby introducing a confounding
factor.
For these reasons, the observed difference in the treatment effect over differ-
ent study windows is consistent with different interpretations. It may be that
the observed drop in the treatment effect when the bandwidth includes the
Christmas holidays is due to Christmas itself. In line with this interpreta-
tion, we observe the same phenomenon in 2004 and 2012 (there are no data
for 2008). In turn, this “Christmas effect” could be due both to the different
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likelihood of different households to be willing to complete surveys during
Christmas holidays, or to a mitigating effect of religious values on racial bias.
It may also be that other events for which we are not accounting, possibly
unrelated to American Politics, imposed further changes to race-related at-
titudes. Finally, it may also be due to the fact that contagion is a rather
short-lived phenomenon, meaning that as the salience of the U.S. presiden-
tial election decreased, race-related attitudes returned to their original levels.
• Analysis by country. Figure 8 provides the timing of the interviews for each
of the countries used in our analysis. The 2016 election of Donald Trump fell
inside the survey period range of 14 of them. Iceland, however, has only 5 re-
spondents before the election and was therefore discarded. Table 11 interacts
the main dependent variable with each country dummy at a time. It shows
that our main result is always significant at least at p < .05, and hence is
not driven by outliers. Austria, Israel, the Netherlands, and Norway have
a significantly higher treatment effect than the average, whereas in Estonia,
Finland, Sweden, and Slovenia the outcome is significantly lower than the av-
erage. It would be interesting to run a comparative analysis, and identify the
country-level variables that shape country-level treatment effects. However,
the number of control and treated units per country is small when focusing
on the relevant interval of time, making this analysis difficult.
• Online search. Figure 9 compares trends of Google searches in our sample
of countries and in the U.S. for both “Trump” (Figure 9a) and “Racism” (Figure
9b). In both cases and for both geographic units, searches are the highest on
November 9, the after-election day, confirming that Donald Trump’s election
was connected with racism. Searches of Trump are more concentrated on
November 9, 2016, for our sample than for the U.S., while the opposite is true
for “racism” (and its translation in each country’s language).
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Racial bias (0-1)
Bush 2004 Obama 2008 Obama 2012 Trump-Bush Trump-Obama Trump-Obama
Treatment (0-1) -.010 -.032** -.017 .032*** .055*** .034**
SE (.007) (.013) (.014) (.011) (.015) (.015)
N.obs 10,817 7,191 7,894 18,108 14,908 15,661
Country Effects X X X X X X
Demographics X X X X X X
Socioeconomics X X X X X X
Voting X X X X X X
Entropy balancing X X X X X X
∗: significant at .1, ∗∗: significant at .05, ∗∗∗: significant at .01. Coefficients: average marginal effects following a logit estimation.
Errors clustered at the country level and country-year for the difference in difference analysis. Demographics: age, age squared, gender,
minority status, household status, and domicile. Socioeconomics: education attainment, income, and recent short-run unemployment.
Education attainment ranges from 1 to 5 for Bush 2004 and Obama 2008. Entropy balancing is defined to satisfy moment conditions
until skewness, separately for each round of the survey. Design weights apply. Bush 2004: Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic,
Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, UK, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and Slo-
vakia. Obama 2008: Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Israel, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Slovenia, and Sweden. Obama 2012: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Cyprus, Germany, Estonia, Finland, UK, Ireland, Israel, Island,
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Sweden , Slovenia, and Slovakia. Source: ESS, rounds 2 - 4 - 6 -8.
Table 7: Trump v. previous elections. Effect of past elections on self-reported racial
bias.
Figure 6: Effect of Donald Trump’s election on unrelated “placebo” issues.
Figure 7: Kernel density of the permuted treatment effects.
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Racial bias (0-1)
Fake treatment date November 1 October 24 October 18 October 9
Treatment (0-1) .008 -.008 -.000 -.005
SE (.013) (.015) (.008) (.009)
N. Obs 3,773 6,512 9,697 11,961
Country Effects X X X X
Demographics X X X X
Socioeconomic X X X X
Voting X X X X
Entropy balancing X X X X
∗: significant at .1, ∗∗: significant at .05, ∗∗∗ : significant at .01. Coefficients: average marginal effects following
Logit estimation. Countries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Estonia, Finland, UK, Israel, Norway, Sweden,
and Slovenia. Demographics: age, age squared, gender, household status, minority status, and domicile. Socioeconomics:
education attainment, income, and recent short-run unemployment. Entropy balancing designed to satisfy moment con-
ditions until skewness. Design weights apply. Source: ESS, round 8.
Table 8: Electoral v. Campaign effect. Effect of fake treatments election on self-
reported racial bias.
Racist v. Immigration attitudes
Oppose Oppose Immigration Immigration
refugees poor migrants harms economy harms culture
(1-4) (1-4) (0-10) (0-10)
Treatment (0-1) -.047 .002 .042 .049
SE (.058) (.053) (.042) (.040)
N. Obs 7,733 6,648 7,661 7,712
Electoral v. Bandwagon effect
Left-right Support Oppose Oppose
placement Populist Redistribution gay rights
(1-10) (0-1) (1-5) (1-5)
Treatment (0-1) .014 -.009 -.003 -.047
SE (.053) (.016) (.043) (.055)
N. Obs 7,258 3,239 7,753 7,675
Country Effects X X X X
Demographics X X X X
Socioeconomic X X X X
Voting X X X X
∗: significant at .1, ∗∗: significant at .05, ∗∗∗ : significant at .01. Coefficients: outputs from ordered logit regressions.
Errors clustered at the country level. Countries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Estonia, Finland, UK, Israel,
Norway, Sweden, and Slovenia. Demographics: age, age squared, gender, household status, minority status, and domicile.
Socioeconomics: education attainment, income , and recent short-run unemployment. Entropy balancing to satisfy moment
conditions until skewness. Design weights apply. Source: ESS, round 8.
Table 9: Racist v. Immigration attitudes and Electoral v. Bandwagon effect. Effect
of Donald Trump’s Election on ideology and further immigration-related attitudes.
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Racial bias (0-1)
7 days 15 days 21 days 30 days 45 days 60 days All
Treatment (0-1) .019** .023*** .014*** .013* .010* .001 -.011
SE (.009) (.008) (.006) (.007) (.006) (.006) (.010)
N. Obs 3,879 7,717 10,166 13,917 18,278 21,161 23,757
Country Effects X X X X X X X
Demographics X X X X X X X
Socioeconomic X X X X X X X
Voting X X X X X X X
Entropy balancing X X X X X X X
∗: significant at .1, ∗∗: significant at .05, ∗∗∗ : significant at .01. Coefficients: average marginal effects following a logit estimation. Errors clustered at
the country level. Countries: Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Estonia, Finland, UK, Israel, Norway, Sweden, and Slovenia. Demographics: age,
age squared, gender, household status, minority status, and domicile. Socioeconomics: education attainment, income , and recent short-run unemployment.
Entropy balancing satisfies moment conditions until skewness. Design weights apply. Source: ESS, round 8.
Table 10: Effect of Donald Trump’s election on self-reported racial bias, by time interval.
Racial bias (0-1)
AT BE CH CZ DE EE FI
Treatment .020** .023** .023*** .021** .023*** .027*** .028***
SE (.008) (.008) (.008) (.010) (.009) (.009) (.007)
Treatment × Country .021*** .005 -.004 .008 .002 -.033*** -.054***
SE (.008) (.009) (.008) (.011) (.009) (.008) (.007)
UK IL NL NO SE SI
Treatment .023*** .020*** .023*** .020*** .024*** .024***
SE (.008) (.008) (.009) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Treatment × Country -.002 .036*** .027*** .094*** xenophobic -.006
SE (.008) (.009) (.009) (.008) (.007) (.008)
∗: significant at .1, ∗∗: significant at .05, ∗∗∗ : significant at .01. Coefficients: average marginal effects following a logit estimation. Errors clustered at the country level.
Entropy balancing to satisfy moment conditions until skewness. Design weights apply. Source: ESS, round 8.
Table 11: Effect of Donald Trump’s election on self-reported racial bias, interacting with
each country.
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Figure 8: Data distribution by country. The green line represents the date of the US
Presidential election (November 8, 2016).
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(a) Trump. (b) Racism.
Figure 9: Google trends on “Trump” and “racism” one months before and after the election. Black
line: U.S, grey line: our sample. Units in the y−axis use information on search traffic on Google
browser to compute means relative to an arbitrary initial value with respect to which each data
point is scaled. For our sample, we first collect data for each country and then average them out.
For “racism”, we also collect the country translation (e.g. for Germany, we separately collected
“racism” and “rassismus”, and averaged them out).
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